We are trying to avoid the same group so that we get this group think that people can attribute if you only talk to the same people over and over... You don’t get good outcomes unless there is a broad diversity of views, discussion, debate.

The St. Louis Fed President said when it comes to monetary policy changes, "ultimately, it's the chairman's call".

From the Q&A session as reported by Dow Jones

To be sure, the Committee looks to the Chairman to provide strong leadership.  The Chairman's special role is partly legal and structural--as the chair of the Board and the Committee and as the Committee's representative in front of Congress where the FOMC is held accountable for its actions... But in my experience, the other members of the Committee are also important for good policy.  Effective Chairmen cannot operate independently of the sentiment on the Committee; ultimately, the authority of the Chairman rests on his ability to persuade the other members of the Committee that the choices they are making under his leadership will accomplish their objectives.  The better the collection of individuals he needs to persuade, the better the policy is likely to be. 

...

Could the functioning of the FOMC be improved?  Certainly, and Chairman Bernanke has moved to further utilize the diverse views of the FOMC members, while maintaining the leadership necessary to keep this diverse group headed in the appropriate direction. 

In addition, the structure of the FOMC, like that of a number of foreign monetary authorities, may also provide Bayesian-like benefits in attempting to deal with uncertainty.  Many of the individuals who participate in policymaking at the Fed have different views about the structure of the economy.  These differences enter our discussions and, through the Committee’s deliberations, affect the course of policy, although, I admit, how we weigh these competing views to arrive at a decision can appear to be murky.  Certainly, the process is one that a good Bayesian might find hard to recognize.  Nevertheless, studies suggest that the decisions reached by committees are usually superior to those produced by individuals.

My experience in surveying you has been that if I ask the 19 of you “What is the color of an orange?” I couldn’t be sure of getting a majority on a single answer. [Laughter] This most recent survey was no exception. Almost as many of you strongly endorsed an expedited release of your projections as strongly opposed it. An equal number of you endorsed it as opposed it, and there were two lonely people who were indifferent. [Laughter] Thus, since expediting the release of the forecast is a decision that cannot be reversed, it doesn’t seem appropriate to move forward with a discussion of it today.

My own view is that we are approaching the limits of purely qualitative communication and should consider the inclusion of quantitative information presented in a clearly specified framework. For example, like policymakers at many other central banks, the FOMC could specify its long-term inflation objective and include explicit economic forecasts, conditioned on alternative assumptions, in its statements or in regular reports. That being said, one must recognize that the FOMC is not a "unitary actor," as the political scientists term it, but a committee of nineteen highly independent people. With the best will in the world, achieving a Committee consensus on a detailed forecast (for example) will always be difficult in the short time available. Some ambiguity in the FOMC's communications may therefore be unavoidable.