Speeding up the release of the minutes was seen as helping markets interpret our policy actions in the context of evolving economic developments and so better anticipate the course of interest rates.

We recognized, however, that there are risks to accelerated release: In particular, there is a possibility that, at times, the markets could misinterpret the minutes. In the end, our clear consensus was that the likely benefits outweigh the risks.

My experience in surveying you has been that if I ask the 19 of you “What is the color of an orange?” I couldn’t be sure of getting a majority on a single answer. [Laughter] This most recent survey was no exception. Almost as many of you strongly endorsed an expedited release of your projections as strongly opposed it. An equal number of you endorsed it as opposed it, and there were two lonely people who were indifferent. [Laughter] Thus, since expediting the release of the forecast is a decision that cannot be reversed, it doesn’t seem appropriate to move forward with a discussion of it today.

I think releasing the minutes earlier is one more step in the transparency and openness of the Central Bank. I think it'll take a while before the markets understand the context of the conversation [at the FOMC meeting]. This was the first time. By its very nature, it's going to take a while. But markets learn.

Minutes of FOMC meetings necessarily contain elements of both policy inclination and economic outlook. Benefits flow from a more timely release of a fuller, more nuanced explanation of why the policy decision was made than is possible in an announcement.

Reactions to the minutes could be sizable, as they were last Tuesday, but because the minutes do elaborate on the rationale for the Committee's decisions and outlook, these reactions should help markets anticipate policy actions and price assets in ways that foster economic stability.

Early release of the minutes could have costs if Committee members became more guarded in their discussion out of concern about the effects of their remarks when reported or if, over time, the minutes themselves became less comprehensive. In my view, neither of these developments is an inevitable consequence of the new schedule, and I am sure the Committee will resist any temptation to allow them to occur.

I must say that I am opposed to intermeeting moves in general in the absence of some compelling new piece of information of the sort that we confronted in the fall of 1998 or some other totally unexpected shock.  In my view, intermeeting moves create the expectation going forward, for many months or quarters to come, that an intermeeting move might be considered.  That adds to the riskiness of the short-run trading environment in the markets, including the equity market.  The presumption is that with greater risk in the market, prices will tend to be lower and expected yields have to be higher to compensate for the greater risk.  So I'm concerned that an intermeeting move in the near future would simply create more problems for us going forward.  I don't think it matters for the longer-run course of the economy whether rates are moved down now or on May 15th.  But an intermeeting move does produce an environment of greater uncertainty about the way in which we will proceed in the period ahead.  So, I must say that I am very opposed to an intermeeting move in the absence of compelling new information.