I would not expect the Federal Reserve Act to be opened and revised in any important respect in the absence of a significant monetary problem.  ... From time to time, there will probably be some attacks on us from Congress. That happens. But if we continue to perform pretty well on the macroeconomic front, I don’t think we’re going to be very vulnerable, and the attacks that occur from time to time will not have any material effect on the law. That means that the Federal Reserve banks will shrink in terms of their operating responsibilities. I think we need to get used to the prospect of Reserve banks being smaller in terms of employment, and more vigorous and more rigorous in terms of our intellectual output.

I think there are important questions on the table about the structure of regulatory authority and responsibility at the national (level).

But no matter how that comes out, I think the structure of the Federal Reserve system has served this country very well and in my view it ought to be preserved.

From comments to press, as reported by Reuters

Presidents have tended to dissent a little more than Governors.  The greater number of dissents by presidents might reflect a number of factors.  For one, presidents have their own staffs, which can help support alternative views in preparing for a meeting.  Board members share a common staff with the Chairman, and, being in the same building, perhaps have a greater opportunity to influence and be influenced by the Chairman.  In this regard, Bank presidents may act like "outsiders" more readily than Board members.  At the same time, Bank presidents tend to be longer tenured than Board members, and can contribute the institutional memory one might expect from "insiders" when Board membership turns over rapidly. 

Presidents have tended to dissent a little more than Governors.  The greater number of dissents by presidents might reflect a number of factors.  For one, presidents have their own staffs, which can help support alternative views in preparing for a meeting.  Board members share a common staff with the Chairman, and, being in the same building, perhaps have a greater opportunity to influence and be influenced by the Chairman.  In this regard, Bank presidents may act like "outsiders" more readily than Board members.  At the same time, Bank presidents tend to be longer tenured than Board members, and can contribute the institutional memory one might expect from "insiders" when Board membership turns over rapidly. 

...

FOMC members recognize the degree of uncertainty around their judgments.  Unless they perceive that a serious misjudgment is being made, they expect, given common objectives, that when they prefer another policy and their analysis later proves correct, the Committee is likely to move in their direction in time to forestall problems developing.  And they may see their influence on policy as greater over time if they are usually part of the consensus. 

My responsibility at the FOMC is to contribute to national policy formulation. I am not there to represent the interests of the Southeast—rather to extrapolate from the situation in this part of the country to the national picture.

[T]he emphasis of our policy analysis and our policy decisions must be on what serves the best interests of the nation as a whole. But the Directors’ independent assessment of conditions in specific regions and specific industries often gives us insights into developing trends that the national data may not reflect for weeks or months.

The contributions of the Reserve Banks are perhaps most visible to the public in the sphere of monetary policy. All twelve presidents attend and participate actively in the meetings of the Federal Open Market Committee. What they tell the Committee about what they are hearing from their contacts helps us recognize shifting economic conditions before they are evident in the data. Their reports often illuminate the reasons for the data we are receiving, thereby helping us anticipate what will come next. Their policy perspectives are informed by the research and analysis of outstanding staffs.

...Reserve Banks also play an increasingly important role in reaching out to convey information to the community. Through extensive education efforts, speeches by their presidents and other officers, and discussions with their boards of directors and other groups, Reserve Banks foster understanding about the System, its policies, and its objectives, as well as about matters of general economic interest.

The Federal Reserve's 12-bank system was not established as simply a check-processing system.   It was designed to serve multiple interests across a variety of regional and financial institutions.   It was designed to assure broad input to decision and to provide a mechanism to build national policy consensus across broad regional, economic and cultural differences.  And it was designed as a public-private partnership, accountable to, and yet independent of, the government.  To miss these connections is to incorrectly tie the Federal Reserve’s structure to its processing activities rather than to its efforts of assuring trust in the institution.