I think we at the Fed must fully and frontally address the concern of many who feel that too much power is concentrated in the New York Fed. I am a great admirer of Bill Dudley. I consider him a dear friend and a man of tremendous capacity both as a policymaker and as a regulator of the financial institutions in his district. And I have enormous respect for Simon Potter and the good women and men who work our trading desk, faithfully implementing the instructions they receive from the FOMC, which crafts the nations monetary policy. Yet I understand the suspicions that surround the New York Fed.
There is an ancient Arab saying that one should "trust in Allah but tie your camel." I would suggest the following common-sense proposals for quelling concerns for securing our franchise as an independent Fed and, in fact, creating a more efficient policymaking and implementing process. Bill, you might not like these, but I think they are needed:
1) We should rotate the vice chairmanship of the FOMC. Under the current structure, the president of the New York Fed is the FOMCs permanent vice chair, which renders him the second-most-powerful person at the table, behind the Chair. The purpose of the FOMC is to decide policy and to instruct the New York trading desk to implement it by managing the Feds System Open Market Account and short-term trading operations. Having the New York Fed president as the FOMCs vice chair gives the appearance of a conflict of interest. To correct this, I would rotate that position every two years to one of the other 11 Fed presidents.
We have a convenient mechanism for doing so: The 12 Fed presidents meet frequently to discuss operational matters under the Conference of Presidents. Remember, there are no operating entities at the Board of Governors in Washington; it is the 12 Banks that lend money through their discount windows, house the forces that examine banks, operate the vaults that keep safe the peoples cash, and so on. The Conference of Presidents rotates its chair among the presidents on a biennial basis. So I would simply have the chairman of the Conference of Presidents automatically become vice chair of the FOMC. This way, over the course of two years, the Federal Reserve representatives of all 50 states (and all congressional districts) would occupy the second-most-important slot on the FOMC, and any appearance of conflicted interest would disappear.
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I would give the Federal Reserve Bank presidents an equal number of votes as the Washington-based governors, save the Chair.
Presently, the New York Fed gets a permanent vote and the remaining 11 Banks get four votes, with Cleveland and Chicago voting every two years and the rest voting every three years. This makes no sense to me. The population of the New York Federal Reserve district is smaller than that of the San Francisco, Atlanta, Chicago, Richmond and Dallas districts. The Cleveland district is much smaller than New Yorks, roughly equal to that of Kansas City, and only slightly larger than that of St. Louis, Boston and Philadelphiaeach of which has 6 percent or less of the countrys population. (Minneapolis is the smallest district, with fewer than 3 percent of the nations population and roughly 1 percent of the Federal Reserves deposits.)
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The current voting schedule makes no sense to me. But I wouldnt necessarily change it simply to avenge the past. I would change it to balance out the division of power between the Federal Reserve Banks that are out in the field and among the people and businesses that operate our economy and have their own independent research staffs, and the Board of Governors, which is Beltway bound geographically and is briefed and guided by a single staff. I have great admiration for the brilliance and integrity of the members of the Board of Governors research staff. But you will notice that for at least a couple of decades, the governors have tended to vote in a block, and it brings to mind Peter Weirs romantic comedy Green Card, where the character played by Gerard Depardieu chastises the woman played by Andie MacDowell, saying, "You get all your opinions from the same place." The members of the Board get their opinions from the same staff; the Fed bankers who sit at the FOMC table get theirs from 12 disparate staffs of the same high quality as that which resides in Washington.
I would give six Banks the vote to match the six governors other than the Chair. The next year, the other six would have the vote. The Chair would then be the tiebreaker if a tie were to ensue, though given the collegial way in which we conduct our deliberations, my guess is that a tiebreaker would be a rarity. Thus, over a two-year stretch, all 50 states and all congressional districts would have someone representing their constituents sitting as a voter at the table. Every year, six Fed Banks whose presidents serve under boards of directors chosen from within the states in their districts would match wits with Fed governors appointed by presidents and approved by Congress, providing a balance between what some might consider representatives of Main Street and Washington factotums. To me, this is eminently sensible.