“The idea that the Fed might get behind the curve is a powerful one, and that’s certainly been the history of the institution. People are right to worry about that,” Mr. Bullard said.

Mr. Bullard said he did not share the sentiment of some of his colleagues, expressed in the Fed statement after its July meeting, that its benchmark rate may need to remain historically low “even after employment and inflation are near mandate-consistent levels.”

He said he has not revised his view of the long-run fed funds rate as somewhere around 4%. For this reason, Mr. Bullard thinks the Fed may need to raise rates more quickly than some of his colleagues do. “It takes a long time to do this normalization–it’s like turning a supertanker in the ocean,” Mr. Bullard said. “Waiting too long might get us into trouble.”

…

“The end of the first quarter of 2015 is still my preferred liftoff date” for raising the fed-funds rate, Mr. Bullard said.

[KELLY] EVANS: Next year Dallas Fed President Richard Fisher just said he thinks more of the Fed is coming around to his view which is a more hawkish one. I guess that means that you are not one of them?

LOCKHART: I still maintain that sometime around next year onward perhaps in the second half of next year is likely to be the right time for considering a rate move. I am still looking for let's say an accumulation of validating data to tell us that we are on the track that we need to be on to close in on our objectives. So I guess I am a little bit slower on the trigger than Richard Fisher.

I feel personally that we are closer to liftoff than we were, people felt we were, the market assumed we were, some time late in 2015... At the last meeting, I felt, as I listened to the discussion at the table, that my views were being digested by more and more participants.

Of course, the outlook for the economy and financial markets is never certain, and now is no exception. Therefore, the Committee's decisions about the path of the federal funds rate remain dependent on our assessment of incoming information and the implications for the economic outlook. If the labor market continues to improve more quickly than anticipated by the Committee, resulting in faster convergence toward our dual objectives, then increases in the federal funds rate target likely would occur sooner and be more rapid than currently envisioned. Conversely, if economic performance is disappointing, then the future path of interest rates likely would be more accommodative than currently anticipated.

And I would say even if you consider our forward guidance we put in place in march, the committee indicated that even after we think the time has come to raise rates, that we think it will be some considerable time before we move them back to historically normal levels, and that reflects -- well, different people have different views, but to my mind, it in part reflects the fact that headwinds holding back the recovery do continue. Productivity growth has been slow, and of course, we need to be cautious to make sure that the economy continues to recover.

Even when the economy gets back on track, it doesn't mean that these headwinds will have completely disappeared. And in addition to that, productivity growth is rather low. At least that may not be a permanent state of affairs, but it's certainly something that we have seen in the aftermath. We'll -- we've seen it during most of the recovery. That's a factor that I think is suppressing business investment and will work for some time to hold interest rates down. These concerns and these factors are related to what economists are discussing, including secular stagnation. The committee -- you know, when it thinks about what is normal in the longer run, the committee has recently slightly reduced their estimates of what will be normal in the longer run. It -- the median view on that is now something around 3 and 3 1/4 percent, but we don't really know. But it's the same -- the same factors that are making the committee feel that it will be appropriate to raise rates only gradually, they're some of the same factors that figure in the secular stagnation.

Although FOMC participants provide a number of explanations for the federal funds rate target remaining below its longer-run normal level, many cite the residual effects of the financial crisis. These include restrained household spending, reduced credit availability, and diminished expectations for future growth in output and incomes, consistent with the view that the potential growth rate of the economy may be lower for some time.

Let me reiterate, however, that the Committee’s expectation for the path of the federal funds rate target is contingent on the economic outlook. If the economy proves to be stronger than anticipated by the Committee, resulting in a more rapid convergence of employment and inflation to the FOMC’s objectives, then increases in the federal funds rate target are likely to occur sooner and to be more rapid than currently envisaged. Conversely, if economic performance disappoints, resulting in larger and more persistent deviations from the Committee’s objectives, then increases in the federal funds rate target are likely to take place later and to be more gradual.

I see the decline in mandate-consistent real interest rates as grounded in an increase in the demand for, and a fall in the supply of, safe financial investment vehicles. Importantly, I see these changes as likely to be highly persistent.
There are many factors underlying the increased demand for safe assets. I’ll discuss three that strike me as particularly important: tighter credit access, heightened perceptions of macroeconomic risk and increased uncertainty about federal fiscal policy.

In terms of credit access, I don’t think that it’s controversial to say that credit access is more limited than in 2007. What is less generally realized, I think, is that restrictions on households’ and businesses’ ability to borrow typically lead them to spend less and save more.

I can best illustrate this point through an example. Consider a household that wants to purchase a new home. In 2007, that household could have received a mortgage with a down payment of 10 percent of the purchase price, or even lower. In 2014, that same household is considerably more likely to need a down payment of 20 percent. These tighter mortgage standards mean that, to buy a similarly priced house, the household needs to first acquire more assets.

Thus, the demand for safe assets has risen because of tighter limits on credit access. It has also risen because of households’ and businesses’ assessments of macroeconomic risk… [I]n the wake of the Great Recession and the Not-So-Great Recovery, the story is different. Now, more workers see themselves as being exposed to the risk of persistent deterioration in labor incomes. More businesses see themselves as being exposed to the risk of a radical and persistent downshift in the demand for their products. These workers and businesses have an incentive to accumulate more safe assets as a way to self-insure against this enhanced macroeconomic risk.

The federal fiscal situation is the third key source of elevated uncertainty. The federal government faces a long-run disconnect between its overt commitments and the baseline path of federal tax collections. This disconnect can only be resolved by raising taxes and/or cutting the long-run arc of spending… The prospect of reductions in Medicare, Medicaid or Social Security gives some households an incentive to demand more safe assets as a way of replacing those lost potential benefits.

I’ve argued that, due in part to tighter credit access and higher uncertainty, the demand for safe financial assets has risen since 2007. At the same time, the global supply of assets perceived as safe has also fallen. Americans—and many others around the world—thought in 2007 that it was highly unlikely that American residential land, and assets backed by land, could ever fall in value by 30 percent. Not anymore. Similarly, investors around the world viewed all forms of European sovereign debt as a safe investment. Not anymore.

Thus, the FOMC is confronted with a greater demand for safe assets and tighter supply of safe assets than in 2007. These changes in asset markets mean that, at any given level of real interest rates, households and businesses spend less. Their decline in spending pushes down on both prices and employment. As a result, the FOMC has to lower the real interest rate to achieve its objectives.2

I often hear that the FOMC has created a low interest rate environment that is harmful for savers and others. In my view, like savers, the FOMC is being forced to make unusual decisions by an unusual economic environment that is not of its own making. The FOMC has been confronted with a significant increase in safe asset demand and a significant fall in safe asset supply. Faced with these changes, the Committee can only achieve its macroeconomic objectives by taking actions to push down the real interest rate. Indeed, as I argued earlier, the subdued outlook for prices and employment suggests that the FOMC’s actions have not lowered the real interest rate sufficiently.

What about the future? The passage of time will ameliorate these changes in the demand for and supply of safe assets—but only partially. Any long-run forecast has enormous attendant uncertainties. But I expect that for a considerable period of time—possibly the next five years or more—credit market access will remain limited relative to what borrowers had available in 2007. I expect that many workers and businesses will remain more concerned than in 2007 about the risk of a large adverse shock. And I also expect that businesses will continue to feel a heightened degree of uncertainty about taxes and households will continue to feel a heightened degree of uncertainty about the level of federal government benefits. These considerations suggest that, for many years to come, the FOMC will have to maintain low real interest rates to achieve its congressionally mandated goals. I see this conclusion as broadly consistent with the April FOMC statement, which predicts that the target fed funds rate will remain low for some time after inflation and employment are near mandate-consistent levels.

I've given you the broad strokes of a pretty optimistic outlook...

As confirming evidence, I'll be paying attention to consumer spending and consumer confidence. Data on both have been, on balance, encouraging. I'll be monitoring industrial activity closely. While the manufacturing production numbers stepped down in April following very strong gains in February and March, the April report from purchasing managers on production and orders was quite positive. And I'll be looking for sustained employment gains...

At any given juncture, absolute certainty of the economy's direction is not achievable. As I've suggested, I feel the need to see confirming evidence in the data validating the view that above-trend growth is occurring and is sustainable, and that the FOMC is closing in on its policy objectives. One quarter's data isn't enough. I expect it will take a number of months for me to arrive at conviction on that account.

When the first move to tighten policy is taken, I would expect it to begin a cycle of gradually rising rates. This will be a significant, even historic, transition that must be executed skillfully, with tools sufficient to the task, and with clear communication that fosters orderly market adjustment, to the extent possible. The discussion of so-called policy normalization documented in the latest minutes of the FOMC was just a first step, in my opinion.

It bears repeating that a discussion of policy normalization does not necessarily imply that a shift in policy is imminent. For the reasons I have discussed, I, as one policymaker, am not in a rush to get to liftoff. I continue to be comfortable with a projection of the second half of next year (2015) as likely timing.

With respect to the trajectory of rates after lift-off, this also is highly dependent on how the economy evolves. My current thinking is that the pace of tightening will probably be relatively slow. This depends, however, in large part, not only on the economy’s performance, but also on how financial conditions respond to tightening. After all, monetary policy works through financial conditions to affect aggregate demand and supply. If the response of financial conditions to tightening is very mild—say similar to how the bond and equity markets have responded to the tapering of asset purchases since last December—this might encourage a somewhat faster pace. In contrast, if bond yields were to move sharply higher, as was the case last spring, then a more cautious approach might be warranted.
In terms of the level of rates over the longer-term, I would expect them to be lower than historical averages for three reasons. First, economic headwinds seem likely to persist for several more years. While the wealth loss following the financial crisis has largely been reversed, the Great Recession has scarred households and businesses­—this is likely to lead to greater precautionary saving and less investment for a long time. Also, as noted earlier, headwinds in the housing area seem likely to dissipate only slowly.
Second, slower growth of the labor force due to the aging of the population and moderate productivity growth imply a lower potential real GDP growth rate as compared to the 1990s and 2000s. Because the level of real equilibrium interest rates appears to be positively related to potential real GDP growth, this slower trend implies lower real equilibrium interest rates even after all the current headwinds fully dissipate.
Third, changes in bank regulation may also imply a somewhat lower long-term equilibrium rate. Consider that, all else equal, higher capital requirements for banks imply somewhat wider intermediation margins. While higher capital requirements are essential in order to make the financial system more robust, this is likely to push down the long-term equilibrium federal funds rate somewhat.
Putting all these factors together, I expect that the level of the federal funds rate consistent with 2 percent PCE inflation over the long run is likely to be well below the 4¼ percent average level that has applied historically when inflation was around 2 percent. Precisely how much lower is difficult to say at this point in time.