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Overview: Wed, July 22

Daily Agenda

Time Indicator/Event Comment
07:00MBA mortgage prch. indexMild declines the last two weeks
09:20Fed bill purchase4- to 12-month maturities
11:00Treasury buyback announcement (liq support)Nominal coupons 10Y to 30Y
11:3017-wk bill auction$72 billion offering
13:0020-yr bond (r) auction$13 billion offering
14:00Treasury buyback (liq support)TIPS 1Y to 10Y
15:00Treasury investor class auction dataMid-July data

Federal Reserve and the Overnight Market

Treasury Finance

  • Treasury Highlights for Wednesday, July 22, 2026

    9:20 am: Fed bill purchase in the 4- to 12-month sector
    11:00 am: Treasury buyback announcement
    11:30 am: 17-week bill auction
    1:00 pm: 20-year bond (r) auction
    2:00 pm: Treasury buyback operation

US Economy

This Week's MMO

  • MMO for July 20, 2026

    The Treasury’s quarterly dealer discussion agenda, which was released on Friday, revisited the question of whether it should implement a short-term investment program for cash in the TGA that exceeds its daily minimum cash balance target.  The intramonthly peaks and valleys of its prudential cash balance framework mean that the Treasury can go for extended periods over the course of each month with more cash in the TGA than strictly required.  The financial benefits of redeploying that cash into the repo market are limited in the current market environment, but might become more substantial in the (we think unlikely) event that the moved to a scarce reserves framework.  This week’s newsletter looks at the additional background questions the Treasury is asking about the proposal this quarter.

Informational Advantages

William Poole

Mon, February 11, 2008

When I came to the St. Louis Fed, I was well prepared for my FOMC responsibilities in most respects. I knew a lot about monetary economics and monetary history. What I did not know was the art of communicating with the press and general public. The professional literature in economics was full of insights into the importance of private-sector expectations about monetary policy but essentially silent on how those expectations were formed, except for the assumption that expectations would not be systematically wrong and would converge to being correct eventually. Once I started fielding questions from the press after my speeches and talking informally before a wide range of audiences, I was part of the process of trying to establish correct expectations.

My general approach has been to speak primarily about the policy process rather than the specific situation facing the FOMC at its next meeting. I try to think of myself as speaking to portfolio managers who have a medium-term horizon rather than to traders who have a horizon measured in hours or a few days. I do not disparage traders—they perform an important function. Obviously, I have had internal information that would be of interest to traders but it would be entirely inappropriate—indeed illegal—to disclose confidential FOMC information.

Traders, portfolio managers and many others always want to know my forecast of what will happen at the upcoming FOMC meeting. My standard answer is that I do not forecast monetary policy decisions—my job is to participate in making those decisions. I confess that, initially, this response was something of a dodge, because I usually had a pretty good idea weeks in advance of what my own position at a meeting would be. However, over the years I have become impressed by how often my own position would change even in the days just before a meeting as a consequence of the arrival of new information, including staff analysis and sound arguments by my FOMC colleagues

MMO Analysis