In the case of the tri-party repo market, the stress on repo borrowers was exacerbated by the design of the underlying market infrastructure. In this market, investors provide cash each afternoon to dealers in the form of an overnight loan backed by securities collateral.
Each morning, under normal circumstances, the two clearing banks that operate tri-party repo systems permit dealers to return the cash to their investors and to retake possession of their securities portfolios by overdrawing their accounts at the clearing banks. During the day, the clearing banks finance the dealers’ securities inventories.
Usually, this arrangement works well. However, when a securities dealer becomes troubled or is perceived to be troubled, the tri-party repo market can become unstable. In particular, if there is a material risk that a dealer could default during the day, the clearing bank may not want to return the cash to the tri-party investors in the morning because the bank does not want to risk being stuck with a very large collateralized exposure that could run into the hundreds of billions of dollars. Overnight investors, in turn, don’t want to be stuck with the collateral. So to avoid such an outcome, they may decide not to invest in the first place. These self-protective reactions on the part of the clearing banks and the investors can cause the tri-party funding mechanism to rapidly unravel. This dynamic explains the speed with which Bear Stearns lost funding as tri-party repo investors pulled away quickly.
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Sixth, we could make structural changes to the financial system to make it more stable in terms of liquidity provision. For example, consider the three structural issues outlined earlier that amplified the crisis—tri-party repo, collateral requirements tied to credit ratings, and haircut spirals. In the case of tri-party repo, the amplifying dynamics could be reduced by enforcing standards that limited the scope of eligible collateral or required more conservative haircuts. Formal loss-sharing arrangements among tri-party repo borrowers, investors, and clearing banks might reduce or eliminate any advantage that might stem from running early. Eliminating the market’s reliance on intraday credit provided by clearing banks could eliminate the tension between the interests of clearing banks and investors when a dealer becomes troubled. In the case of collateral requirements, collateral haircuts could be required to be independent of ratings.