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Overview: Tue, July 21

Daily Agenda

Time Indicator/Event Comment
11:004-, 8- and 17-wk bill announcementNo changes expected
11:00Treasury buyback announcement (liq support)TIPS 1Y to 10Y
11:306-wk bill auction$95 billion offering

Federal Reserve and the Overnight Market

Treasury Finance

  • Treasury Highlights for Wednesday, July 22, 2026

    9:20 am: Fed bill purchase in the 4- to 12-month sector
    11:00 am: Treasury buyback announcement
    11:30 am: 17-week bill auction
    1:00 pm: 20-year bond (r) auction
    2:00 pm: Treasury buyback operation

US Economy

This Week's MMO

  • MMO for July 20, 2026

    The Treasury’s quarterly dealer discussion agenda, which was released on Friday, revisited the question of whether it should implement a short-term investment program for cash in the TGA that exceeds its daily minimum cash balance target.  The intramonthly peaks and valleys of its prudential cash balance framework mean that the Treasury can go for extended periods over the course of each month with more cash in the TGA than strictly required.  The financial benefits of redeploying that cash into the repo market are limited in the current market environment, but might become more substantial in the (we think unlikely) event that the moved to a scarce reserves framework.  This week’s newsletter looks at the additional background questions the Treasury is asking about the proposal this quarter.

1987 Stock Market Crash

Frederic Mishkin

Fri, September 28, 2007

When a systemic financial crisis occurs, the emergency lender's most crucial task is to restore confidence in the financial system...  Speed is critical. Experience shows that the faster the lending, the lower the amount of lending necessary.3

To illustrate the benefits of acting quickly, I will use a canonical example, the Federal Reserve's operations in the aftermath of the stock market crash in October 1987. What is remarkable about this episode is that the Federal Reserve did not need to lend directly to the banks to encourage them to lend to the securities firms that needed funds to clear their customers' accounts. ecause the Federal Reserve acted promptly (within a day) and reassured banks that the financial system would not seize up, banks knew that lending to securities firms would be profitable. They saw that making these loans immediately was in their interest, even if they did not borrow from the Federal Reserve. anks thus began lending freely to securities firms, and, as a result, confidence was restored and the fear of crisis diminished almost immediately. The Federal Reserve did not have to increase its lending to the banking system at all, and the actual amount of liquidity that it injected into the banking system through open-market operations in the immediate aftermath of the crash was around $12 billion, which at the time was notable but not exceptional. And the Federal Reserve was able to remove this liquidity almost immediately, within weeks of the crash.

Susan Phillips

Tue, October 14, 1997

Doubts that emerged about the soundness of clearing systems were some of the most frightening aspects of the {1987 stock market } crash. The changes to clearing systems have received far less attention than those to trading systems, but their long-term consequences likely are more profound. Such critical parts of the "plumbing" as the agreements between the futures clearing houses and the settlement banks have been clarified and put on a much sounder footing. In addition, many clearing organizations have established back-up liquidity facilities that will enable them to make payments to clearing members in a timely fashion even if a clearing member has defaulted.

MMO Analysis