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Overview: Mon, May 20

Daily Agenda

Time Indicator/Event Comment
07:30Bostic (FOMC voter)
Appears on Bloomberg television
08:45Bostic (FOMC voter)Gives welcoming remarks at Atlanta Fed conference
09:00Barr (FOMC voter)Speaks at financial markets conference
09:00Waller (FOMC voter)
Gives welcoming remarks
10:30Jefferson (FOMC voter)
On the economy and the housing market
11:3013- and 26-wk bill auction$70 billion apiece
14:00Mester (FOMC voter)
Appears on Bloomberg television
19:00Bostic (FOMC voter)Moderates discussion at financial markets conference

US Economy

Federal Reserve and the Overnight Market

Treasury Finance

This Week's MMO

  • MMO for May 20, 2024

     

    This week’s MMO includes our regular quarterly tabulations of major foreign bank holdings of reserve balances at the Federal Reserve.  Once again, FBOs appear to have compressed their holdings of Fed balances by nearly $300 billion on the latest (March 31) quarter-end statement date.  As noted in the past, we think FBO window-dressing effects are one of a number of ways to gauge the extent of surplus reserves in the banking system at present.  The head of the New York Fed’s market group earlier this month highlighted a few others, which we discuss this week as well.  The bottom line on all of these measures is that any concerns about potential reserve stringency are still a very long way off.

1987 Stock Market Crash

Frederic Mishkin

Fri, September 28, 2007

When a systemic financial crisis occurs, the emergency lender's most crucial task is to restore confidence in the financial system...  Speed is critical. Experience shows that the faster the lending, the lower the amount of lending necessary.3

To illustrate the benefits of acting quickly, I will use a canonical example, the Federal Reserve's operations in the aftermath of the stock market crash in October 1987. What is remarkable about this episode is that the Federal Reserve did not need to lend directly to the banks to encourage them to lend to the securities firms that needed funds to clear their customers' accounts. ecause the Federal Reserve acted promptly (within a day) and reassured banks that the financial system would not seize up, banks knew that lending to securities firms would be profitable. They saw that making these loans immediately was in their interest, even if they did not borrow from the Federal Reserve. anks thus began lending freely to securities firms, and, as a result, confidence was restored and the fear of crisis diminished almost immediately. The Federal Reserve did not have to increase its lending to the banking system at all, and the actual amount of liquidity that it injected into the banking system through open-market operations in the immediate aftermath of the crash was around $12 billion, which at the time was notable but not exceptional. And the Federal Reserve was able to remove this liquidity almost immediately, within weeks of the crash.

Susan Phillips

Tue, October 14, 1997

Doubts that emerged about the soundness of clearing systems were some of the most frightening aspects of the {1987 stock market } crash. The changes to clearing systems have received far less attention than those to trading systems, but their long-term consequences likely are more profound. Such critical parts of the "plumbing" as the agreements between the futures clearing houses and the settlement banks have been clarified and put on a much sounder footing. In addition, many clearing organizations have established back-up liquidity facilities that will enable them to make payments to clearing members in a timely fashion even if a clearing member has defaulted.

MMO Analysis