In its current forward guidance, the FOMC has stated that it expects the fed funds rate to remain extraordinarily low at least until the unemployment rate falls below 6.5 percent. The FOMC could provide additional needed stimulus by lowering the threshold unemployment rate from 6.5 percent to 5.5 percent—that is, by changing one number in the existing statement.

To see why I say so, consider two possible scenarios. In the first, the public believes that the FOMC will begin raising the fed funds rate once the unemployment rate hits 6.5 percent. (To be clear: This belief is consistent with, but not necessarily implied by, the FOMC’s current forward guidance.) In the second, the public believes that the FOMC will defer the initial increase in the fed funds rate until the unemployment rate hits 5.5 percent. The higher unemployment rate in the first scenario means that monetary policy will be tightened sooner, which, in turn, will lead to the unemployment rate being higher for longer. Foreseeing that, people will save more in the first scenario than in the second, to protect themselves against these higher unemployment risks. Because they save more, they spend less, and there is less economic activity.

Thus, lowering the unemployment rate threshold to 5.5 percent would increase the demand for goods and thereby push upward on both employment and prices. Would this extra monetary stimulus result in an undue amount of inflation at some point in the future? ... To me, this historical evidence suggests that, as long as the unemployment rate remains above 5.5 percent, the medium-term inflation outlook will stay close to 2 percent.

I should be clear about a couple of aspects of the thresholds. First, the unemployment rate threshold is not a trigger for FOMC action. Thus, the FOMC may choose not to raise interest rates when the unemployment rate falls below 6.5 percent. Second, I see the FOMCs guidance as providing a great deal of protection against undue inflationary pressures. In particular, the commitment to keep interest rates extraordinarily low is off the table if the medium-term inflation outlook ever rises above 2.5 percent.

In my view, the language now incorporated into the statement affirmatively conveys the Committee's determination to keep monetary policy highly accommodative until well into the recovery. And the specific numbers that were selected as thresholds for a possible change in the federal funds rate target should confirm that the FOMC expects to hold that target lower for longer than would be typical during a normal economic recovery...

I view the Committee's current rate guidance as embodying exactly such a "lower for longer" commitment. In normal times, the FOMC would be expected to tighten monetary policy before unemployment fell as low as 6-1/2 percent. Under the new thresholds guidance, the public is informed that tightening is unlikely as long as unemployment remains above 6-1/2 percent and inflation one to two years out is projected to be no more than a half percentage point above the FOMC's 2 percent longer-run goal.

Forward guidance works by influencing the public’s expected path of short-term interest rates. Expectations of low yields on short-term assets for a prolonged period make investors more willing to purchase and hold longer-term securities. That, of course, increases their prices and reduces their yields. To give you a sense of the impact of this tool, the unexpected extension of our forward guidance in August 2011 lowered yields on longer-term Treasury securities by about 0.2 percentage point. That’s comparable to a cut in the funds rate of ¾ to 1 percentage point. When we cut the funds rate that much, financial markets sit up and take notice.

Although my FOMC colleagues are not ready to choose a particular policy rule or reaction function to govern policy, we continue to explore the efficacy of monetary policy rules as guides to policy, as indicated in the minutes of the July 31-August 1, 2012 FOMC meeting. I believe we should continue to identify simple rules that work across a variety of economic models and try to communicate more information about the Fed’s policy reaction function. We could improve policy transparency and communications by identifying the key economic variables on which we base our policy decisions and then frame the rationale for any change in policy around changes in these key variables. If the Fed is systematic about how it sets policy in normal times, the public will form more accurate judgments about the likely course of policy. This will not only improve the efficacy of monetary policy in normal times by reducing uncertainty and promoting stability, it will also increase the efficacy of forward guidance in extraordinary times, like the ones we find ourselves in today.

[O]ptimal forward guidance requires policymakers to commit to making policy in a way that is different from what policymakers would want to do when the time comes. Economists would say that policymakers are trying to commit to a policy that is not time-consistent. Put another way, former Fed Chairman William McChesney Martin used to say that monetary policy’s job “is to take away the punch bowl just when the party is getting good.” Yet, these models tell us that at the zero lower bound, forward guidance should convey the opposite. That is, it should promise that monetary policy will not remove the punch bowl but allow the party to continue until very late in the evening to ensure that everyone has a good time. But what will make the public believe that policymakers in the future will deviate from past practices in this way? And will policymakers or the public be willing to tolerate the future inflation when it comes and believe that it is only temporary?

A disadvantage of this calendar-based approach was that it might not be clear whether changes in the date reflect changes in the FOMC's outlook for growth, for inflation, or a shift in the desired stance of policy. In December 2012, the FOMC therefore replaced the date with greater detail on the economic conditions that would warrant maintaining the federal funds rate at its present, exceptionally low level. Specifically, it stated that near-zero rates would likely remain appropriate for a considerable time after the asset purchase program ends and "at least as long as the unemployment rate remains above 6-1/2 percent, inflation between one and two years ahead is projected to be no more than a half percentage point above the Committee's 2 percent longer-run goal, and longer-term inflation expectations continue to be well anchored."

It deserves emphasis that a 6-1/2 percent unemployment rate and inflation one to two years ahead that is 1/2 percentage point above the Committee's 2 percent objective are thresholds for possible action, not triggers that will necessarily prompt an immediate increase in the FOMC's target rate. In practical terms, it means that the Committee does not expect to raise the federal funds rate as long as unemployment remains above 6-1/2 percent and inflation one to two years ahead is projected to be less than 1/2 percentage point above its 2 percent objective. When one of these thresholds is crossed, action is possible but not assured.

The Federal Reserve's recent adoption of new monetary policy guidance is "a step in the right direction," but it fails the test of being a systematic approach to action…

"This is not what I would have put in place," Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia President Charles Plosser told reporters on the sidelines of the American Economic Association annual gathering in San Diego. But compared to the Fed's calendar-based interest-rate commitments, it is an improvement, the official said.

…The central banker said one of his biggest beefs with the new threshold regime is that it leaves unresolved what action the Fed will take once those levels are achieved. As the thresholds are not triggers a tightening is not automatic, he observed, but markets may believe otherwise. Mr. Plosser said the thresholds do not achieve the systematic approach he has long called for.

…As he has for some time, he reiterated his opposition to Fed bond buying efforts. "The efficacy of asset purchases is not very high" and the risks created by continuing forward are rising, Mr. Plosser said, adding "I would have stopped earlier" with the purchases.

…The officials cautioned central bank watchers not to read to much into the December FOMC meeting minutes, released Thursday, which saw policy makers speculating over the time frame Fed asset buying might run. Mr. Plosser noted officials have different definitions about the level of progress the central bank will need to make on the jobs front before paring back the bond buying.

As reported by the Wall Street Journal

But these calculations may underestimate the true magnitude of the problem. A funding ratio of 75 percent equates to an assumption of an 8 percent average annual return on the portfolio of investments. It's fair to ask whether this is a realistic assumption given current forecasts of the economic and financial environment. Arguably not.

Using this optimistic 8 percent return assumption, public state and municipal pension funds have an $800 billion funding gap to fill. Using a lower, more realistic return assumption (such as the longer-term rate on U.S. Treasuries) implies a $3 trillion to $4 trillion funding gap. You might call this "the other debt problem" in the United States.

I believe we could take further steps to improve our communications and reduce uncertainty over the path of monetary policy and reduce moral hazard. One enhancement would be to articulate a more rule-like approach to our decision-making process. This means making policy decisions based on available information in a consistent and predictable manner. One cannot know what the future holds or what future policy decisions will be. Policy will be data dependent, but the data should feed into a decision-making process in a mostly systematic or rule-like way.

Going further, the Committee might eliminate the calendar date entirely and replace it with guidance on the economic conditions that would need to prevail before liftoff of the federal funds rate might be judged appropriate. Several of my FOMC colleagues have advocated such an approach, and I am also strongly supportive. The idea is to define a zone of combinations of the unemployment rate and inflation within which the FOMC would continue to hold the federal funds rate in its current, near-zero range. For example, Charles Evans, president of the Chicago Fed, suggests that the FOMC should commit to hold the federal funds rate in its current low range at least until unemployment has declined below 7 percent, provided that inflation over the medium term remains below 3 percent. Narayana Kocherlakota, president of the Minneapolis Fed, suggests thresholds of 5.5 percent for unemployment and 2.25 percent for the medium-term inflation outlook. Under such an approach, liftoff would not be automatic once a threshold is reached; that decision would require further Committee deliberation and judgment.

I believe that the LSAP component of the statement helped bolster the credibility of the forward guidance component by pairing a declaration about future intentions with an immediate and concrete set of actions. And I suspect that this complementarity helps explain the strong positive reaction of the stock market to the release of the statement.

In terms of our monetary policy regime, the FOMC statement noted that the Committee expects to maintain a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy "for a considerable time after the economic recovery strengthens." This is important because in situations such as the one we find ourselves in today, when monetary policy is somewhat constrained because we cannot lower the federal funds rate below zero, one of the most powerful things a central bank can do is to provide guidance as to how it will behave in the future. In this respect, I am pleased that we have drawn a sharper distinction between what we expect the economy to look like in a few years time and how we expect to set policy based on that outlook.

The Feds failure to communicate internally owes to an irony of increased openness. In 1994, under considerable Congressional pressure, the Fed became more transparent. One initiative was for historians. The FOMC decided to release lightly edited, but otherwise complete, transcripts of every meeting, five years after the fact.

What followed was a predictable social dynamic that is never factored in by economists in their theoretical reasoning that more transparency is better. Starting that year, speakers at an FOMC meeting were given a rough draft of their remarks a few weeks after each meeting. Most learned, to their surprise, that they were a lot less lucid speakers than they had imagined. Off-the-cuff responses to prior speakers looked unthoughtful in black and white. Almost immediately, some began bringing prepared remarks. This set off a readiness race that ended with virtually everyone reading from prepared texts.

Meetings got longer and less spontaneous. More problematic still, meetings became a less useful way of exchanging information and changing minds. This led to a new dynamic: When policy views are scripted, the window to influence views opens before the meeting, when scripts are being written, not during the meeting, when scripts are being read. Thus, Fed officials give more speeches and interviews before meetings to signal each other what they will read at the meeting. If a policy issue is contentious -- if it is a close call -- then the volume cranks up. It just so happens that the free investing world is listening to that conversation.

In response to a question about the tools available to the Fed,  Fed Chairman Bernanke said, "There are a range of possibilities. And I -- and I don't want to, you know, give any signal that we're choosing one among... The logical range includes different types of purchase programs. That could include treasuries or include treasuries and mortgage-backed securities. Those are the two things we're allowed to buy. We could also use our discount window for -- for lending purposes, but, you know, that's another possibility. We could use communications to talk about our future plans regarding rates or our balance sheet. And a possibility that we have discussed in the past is cutting the interest we pay on excess reserves."