I can assure you that monetary policy makers are fully committed to acting as needed to withdraw on a timely basis the extraordinary support now being provided to the economy, and we are confident in our ability to do so. To be sure, decisions about when and how quickly to proceed will require a careful balancing of the risk of withdrawing support before the recovery is firmly established versus the risk of allowing inflation to rise above its preferred level in the medium term. However, this delicate balancing of risks is a challenge that central banks face in the early stages of every economic recovery. I believe that we are well equipped to make those judgments appropriately. In addition, when the time comes, our ability to clearly communicate our policy goals and our assessment of the outlook will be crucial to minimizing public uncertainty about our policy decisions.

Third, market participants have at times faced uncertainty about prospective public sector intervention.³ The disparate responses to potential failures at several high-profile organizations last year may have made it difficult for market participants to forecast whether official support would be forthcoming for any given counterparty. Speculation this year about the structure of possible government rescue programs may also be contributing to financial market uncertainty.

I have been predicting an upturn in the overall economy beginning in the second half of 2009, with a slow and gradual return to our full economic potential. To temper that outlook a bit, uncertainty remains unusually high, and one has to be mindful of very real downside risks, including a further deterioration in real estate.

The turmoil intensified in mid-September, and volatility has been elevated since. Financial market participants have faced three major categories of uncertainty. The first concerns the aggregate amount of losses on mortgage lending...

Second, financial market participants have faced uncertainty about where the losses will turn up...

Third, market participants have at times faced uncertainty about prospective public sector intervention.⁴ The disparate responses to potential failures at several high-profile organizations may have made it difficult for market participants to forecast whether official support would be forthcoming for a given counterparty. Shifts in expectations regarding official intervention may have added volatility to financial asset markets that already were roiled by an increasingly uncertain growth outlook. And uncertainty about the form of government support — asset purchases versus dilutive capital purchases, for example — may have hindered the provision of fresh equity capital.

Yet, undoubtedly, the greatest challenge we face is the enormous uncertainty of our situation. One great feature of being an economist in Chicago is that we benefit from the wisdom of many distinguished scholars at our local universities. An example of such wisdom is an observation made long ago by Robert Lucas, a Nobel Laureate from the University of Chicago: "As an advice-giving profession, we economists are in way over our heads." At any time, this is a sobering and humbling thought to remember. Nevertheless, in the current environment, the pursuit of a range of robust policies in the face of large uncertainties is likely to be most efficacious. A good decision-maker can't place all of his or her policy bets on a single hypothesis when the evidence is still ambiguous.

By any measure, September was historic. The events of September contributed substantially to a fundamental restructuring of this country's financial system. It also brought a transition from an incremental approach, including the Federal Reserve's various measures to provide much-needed liquidity to markets, to a comprehensive attack on the diverse elements of the crisis.

...

Looking ahead at the U.S. economy, this is a period of vexing uncertainty...With the deterioration in economic conditions and the recent associated falloff in energy and many other commodity prices, I anticipate further dissipation of inflationary pressures. Nevertheless, given high inflation readings during the summer and into the fall, I'll continue to watch developments closely.

We at the Atlanta Fed expect weakness to persist for some time into 2009 as credit markets gradually improve. The thawing of credit markets is a necessary condition for a recovery back to levels of growth consistent with the economy's underlying potential.

Core inflation for personal consumption expenditures was up to 2.6 percent (year-over-year) in August. In my opinion, this rate has been high...Although some risks to the inflation outlook remain, a forward-looking assessment would put less weight on inflation concerns than earlier this summer.
...
The outlook for real economic activity likely will result in production, spending, and labor markets being very sluggish in the second half of this year and well into 2009. I expect that such activity will then pick up as the housing and financial markets gain headway in working through their problems. Such progress would be signaled by stabilization in construction and improvement in credit flows.
...

There is, of course, a level of cloudiness in any economic forecast. In the current situation, the substantial stress in the financial markets has led to an unusually high degree of uncertainty. This is because it is extremely difficult to assess how the turmoil will influence markets and how policy responses to address the economic unrest will play out over time...We at the Federal Reserve continuously reevaluate the stance of monetary policy in light of current and forecasted conditions, as well as our assessments of the risks to our long-term objectives of maximum sustainable growth and price stability. Currently, these risk assessments must factor in the substantial uncertainties in the outlooks for growth and inflation that I just described. These uncertainties certainly pose difficult challenges for policymakers.

Given the likely drawn-out nature of the prospective adjustments in housing and financial markets, I see the most probable scenario as one in which the performance of the economy remains subpar well into next year and then gradually improves in late 2009 and 2010. As credit restraint abates, the low level of policy interest rates will begin to show through into more accommodative financial conditions. This improvement in financial conditions, together with the gradual stabilization of housing markets and the stimulative effects of lower oil and commodity prices, should lead to a pickup in jobs and income, contributing to a broad recovery in the U.S. economy.

At the same time, inflation seems likely to move onto a downward track. If sustained, the recent declines in commodity prices should soon lead to a sharp reduction in headline inflation. In addition, I expect core inflation to slow from current levels as lower commodity prices and greater economic slack moderate upward pressures on costs. Similar reductions in inflation abroad, as well as the recent appreciation of the dollar, should restrain increases in the prices of imported goods.

I would caution, however, that the uncertainty around my forecast is substantial. The path of the economy will depend critically on how quickly the current stresses in financial markets abate. But these events have few if any precedents, and thus we can have even less confidence than usual in our economic forecasts.

An inability to measure the output gap in real time obviously limits the usefulness of the concept in practical policymaking.  On the other hand, to argue that output gaps are very difficult to measure in real time is not the same as arguing that economic slack does not influence inflation; indeed, the bulk of the evidence suggests that there is a relationship, albeit one that may be less pronounced than in the past.⁷ 

VICE CHAIRMAN GEITHNER. I really couldn’t tell, President Lacker, what inference you were going to draw from that. But I would just reinforce the point that, if you are more worried and uncertain now about the magnitude of the headwinds and the duration, I think it has to mean that you err on the side of going lower sooner. But the main point is that we just don’t know much about it, and I think it is worth a lot of humility. I mean, think how surprised we have been by so much over this period, even with all our thinking through three years ago about alternative paths for housing. So I would just vote for humility. But the basic point is that we have to err on the side of being worried about reducing the risk that you end up with 75 mile an hour headwinds rather than 25 for a long period of time.

….

PRESIDENT LACKER. Our Vice Chairman urges humility. I strongly support that. I agree with President Evans that it’s not obvious that the greater one’s humility, the greater one should favor ease. I think we should be humble about the path of inflation going forward, whether it’s likely to fall on its own. I think we should be humble about our understanding of the output gap. I think we should be humble about whether that’s even a sensible way to think about how real and monetary phenomena interact. The Phillips curve itself embodies a relationship. It is uncertain, but it embodies expectations of our future behavior. I think we should be humble about what those expectations are in the present circumstance. Times in the past when we’ve gotten in trouble on inflation have often been when we were over-solicitous about weak economic growth, and I think we should be humble about whether we’ve completely gotten past those inflation dynamics or not. I think we should be humble about the willingness of our future selves to reverse course, and a lot has been said about that. For some it seems to counsel greater ease now, but I think the opposite argument can be made that the extent to which we think we may be hindered or feel impeded in raising rates, even if we think it’s warranted in the future, should cause us to be more cautious about lowering rates now. It always seems in recoveries that there’s always something that looks fragile, that looks likely to threaten economic growth. You know, one month it will be the commercial paper market and CDO writedowns, and this month it’s monolines. There will be headwinds. I predict we’ll be talking about headwinds a fair amount in the next couple of years. But if those are genuinely going to impede us, we need to be realistic about that, and I think we need to take it on board now. I agree with President Poole. We need to be humble about our ability to prevent a recession. I think we should also be humble about the extent to which what we see in terms of both growth and financial markets is presumptively inefficient and needs remedial action on our part. You spoke several meetings ago, I think a year or two ago, Mr. Chairman, about our need to retain a concern about inflation but not be seen as inflation nutters. I think we need to care about financial fragility but not be fragility nutters.

 In practice, policy decisions are likely to depend on more than the modal forecast used by the authors, such as the degree of uncertainty, the risks around the central tendency, and a weighting of the costs to public welfare from missing the forecast on one side or another. 

After all, as the Nobel laureate Niels Bohr once said (in a comment later attributed to Yogi Berra), "prediction is very difficult, especially when it's about the future."

The FOMC noted on October 31 that "economic growth was solid in the third quarter, and strains in financial markets have eased somewhat." However, the committee added "the pace of economic expansion will likely slow in the near term, partly reflecting the intensification of the housing correction." The committee believed its October 31 policy action, combined with its action taken in September, "should help forestall some of the adverse effects on the broader economy that might otherwise arise from the disruptions in financial markets and promote moderate growth over time."

As discussed a moment ago, my view of the economy is consistent with the FOMC statement, and I supported last week's policy action. In part, my position was based on the notion of insurance against downside risks to the general economy given the unusually high level of uncertainty.

If I were to use one word to characterize our current economic circumstances, that word would be "uncertain." Much of this uncertainty relates to the potential depth, length, and impact of the housing downturn and potential flow-back to Main Street from the turbulence we have seen on Wall Street.

The past decade has also witnessed significant progress in analyzing the policy implications of uncertainty regarding the structure of the economy...

Although Bayesian and robust-control methods provide insights into the nature of optimal policy, the corresponding policy recommendations can be complex and sensitive to the set of economic models being considered.  A promising alternative approach--reminiscent of the work that Bill Poole did in the 1960s--focuses on simple policy rules, such as the one proposed by John Taylor, and compares the performance of alternative rules across a range of possible models and sets of parameter values (Levin, Wieland, and Williams, 1999 and 2003).  That approach is motivated by the notion that the perfect should not be the enemy of the good; rather than trying to find policies that are optimal in the context of specific models, the central bank may be better served by adopting simple and predictable policies that produce reasonably good results in a variety of circumstances.