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Overview: Wed, July 22

Daily Agenda

Time Indicator/Event Comment
07:00MBA mortgage prch. indexMild declines the last two weeks
09:20Fed bill purchase4- to 12-month maturities
11:00Treasury buyback announcement (liq support)Nominal coupons 10Y to 30Y
11:3017-wk bill auction$72 billion offering
13:0020-yr bond (r) auction$13 billion offering
14:00Treasury buyback (liq support)TIPS 1Y to 10Y
15:00Treasury investor class auction dataMid-July data

Federal Reserve and the Overnight Market

Treasury Finance

  • Treasury Highlights for Wednesday, July 22, 2026

    9:20 am: Fed bill purchase in the 4- to 12-month sector
    11:00 am: Treasury buyback announcement
    11:30 am: 17-week bill auction
    1:00 pm: 20-year bond (r) auction
    2:00 pm: Treasury buyback operation

US Economy

This Week's MMO

  • MMO for July 20, 2026

    The Treasury’s quarterly dealer discussion agenda, which was released on Friday, revisited the question of whether it should implement a short-term investment program for cash in the TGA that exceeds its daily minimum cash balance target.  The intramonthly peaks and valleys of its prudential cash balance framework mean that the Treasury can go for extended periods over the course of each month with more cash in the TGA than strictly required.  The financial benefits of redeploying that cash into the repo market are limited in the current market environment, but might become more substantial in the (we think unlikely) event that the moved to a scarce reserves framework.  This week’s newsletter looks at the additional background questions the Treasury is asking about the proposal this quarter.

Too Big to Fail

William Dudley

Fri, March 31, 2000

I agree with those critics who argue that there was something fundamentally unfair about the disparity in treatment between the few large financial institutions that were saved versus the millions of individuals who lost their homes or their jobs. My response is not particularly satisfying. Recessions inflict considerable pain on innocent bystanders in the economy. Depressions greatly compound this pain. Given the Federal Reserve’s role and authority, what we knew at the time and the powers and tools that were available to us, I think we made good choices. If the large systemic banking organizations had failed, the hardships inflicted on households and small business would have been far worse.

From my perspective, I believe that any critique of the Fed or other agencies should be focused more on the regulatory and supervisory shortcomings—some of which, I admit, were ours—that created the economic and financial market circumstances in which the Fed’s extraordinary interventions proved necessary.

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MMO Analysis