As I mentioned, delinquencies will probably rise further for borrowers who have a subprime mortgage with an adjustable interest rate, as many of these mortgages will soon see their rates reset at significantly higher levels.  Indeed, on average from now until the end of next year, nearly 450,000 subprime mortgages per quarter are scheduled to undergo their first interest rate reset.  Relative to past years, avoiding the payment shock of an interest rate reset by refinancing the mortgage will be much more difficult, as home prices have flattened out or declined, thereby reducing homeowners' equity, and lending terms have tightened.  Should the rate of foreclosure rise proportionately, communities as well as individual borrowers would be hurt because concentrations of foreclosures tend to reduce property values in surrounding areas. 

Home losses through foreclosure can be reduced if financial institutions work with borrowers who are having difficulty meeting their mortgage payment obligations.  In recent months, the Federal Reserve and other banking agencies have issued statements calling on mortgage lenders and mortgage servicers to pursue prudent loan workouts...  Comprehensive data on the success of these efforts to avert foreclosures are not available, but my sense is that there is scope for servicers to further increase their loss-mitigation efforts.  The development of standardized approaches to workouts and the sharing of best practices can help increase the scale of the effort, even if, ultimately, workouts must be undertaken loan by loan.  Although workouts are to be encouraged, regulators must be alert to ensure that they are done in ways that protect consumers' interests and do not disguise lenders' losses or impair safety and soundness.

In my view, the most likely story line is one involving a moderate slowdown in economic activity over the coming quarters, with a return to growth near trend by late 2008 as the housing sector begins to recover. Underpinning this story is the view that our modern market economy has a keen ability to self-correct as opportunistic capital moves into depressed markets. Markets correct. And market solutions are preferable. This transition already is happening in the market for subprime mortgages. In this story, financial markets may endure some more weeks or months of volatility, but I believe they will find a restructured state of "normality," involving improved risk management practices, reduced leverage, and greater transparency.

An appropriate public policy posture is to be supportive of market solutions in the financial markets.

Looking ahead, two considerations suggest that conditions for subprime borrowers have the potential to get worse before they get better. First, all indications are that housing activity is continuing to weaken. Incoming data in recent weeks show that sales and new residential construction have declined further. In such an environment, house prices in the aggregate are likely to remain sluggish for some time. Second, the bulk of resets is yet to come: On average, in each quarter from now until the end of next year, monthly payments for more than 400,000 subprime mortgages are scheduled to undergo their first interest rate reset. That number is up from roughly 200,000 per quarter during the first half of 2007. Delinquencies and foreclosures are therefore likely to continue to rise for a number of quarters.

The supply of funds for subprime loans is likely to remain low for some time as investors gather information and reevaluate the risks.

Given the substantial number of resets from now through the end of 2008, however, I believe it would behoove the industry to join together and explore collaborative, creative efforts to develop prudent loan modification programs and other assistance to help large groups of borrowers systematically.

Second, I believe that modernization of programs administered by the Federal Housing Administration, which has considerable experience helping low- and moderate-income households obtain home financing, could also help avoid foreclosures. FHA modernization could give the agency the flexibility to work with private-sector lenders to expedite the refinancing of creditworthy subprime borrowers and to design products that improve affordability through such features as variable maturities or shared appreciation.

Third, we must pursue initiatives to prevent these problems from recurring, and the Federal Reserve is making strides in this direction. ... For example, as I mentioned earlier, failure to escrow for taxes and insurance can lead to a situation akin to payment shock for borrowers. It is a common practice for these payments to be escrowed in the prime markets, and I see no reason that escrows should not be standard practice in the subprime markets too.

The U.S. subprime mortgage market is small relative to the enormous scale of global financial markets. So why was the impact of subprime developments on the markets apparently so large?  To some extent, the outsized effects of the subprime mortgage problems on financial markets may have reflected broader concerns that problems in the U.S. housing market might restrain overall economic growth. But the developments in subprime were perhaps more a trigger than a fundamental cause of the financial turmoil. The episode led investors to become more uncertain about valuations of a range of complex or opaque structured credit products, not just those backed by subprime mortgages. They also reacted to market developments by increasing their assessment of the risks associated with a number of assets and, to some degree, by reducing their willingness to take on risk more generally.

The elevated defaults we have already seen on recent vintages of subprime mortgages have resulted in losses for the highest risk tiers, and have caused investors to sell higher quality securities at a discount, reflecting uncertainty surrounding the accuracy of the investment-grade rating. If the ratings were accurate, highly rated securities containing subprime debt would have only a remote chance of default similar to investment-grade securities containing prime mortgages, home equity loans, or student loans. Unfortunately, underlying assumptions for the subprime market were inaccurate for several reasons I'll describe.

First and most importantly, most parties involved in the process assumed that house prices would continue rising nationally. This assumption seems to have had the biggest impact on the situation we see today. ... Second, the subprime market has grown very rapidly in recent years, so such widespread use of subprime mortgages is a relatively new phenomenon. This limited history made it difficult to assess the likelihood of defaults if underlying economic conditions changed. And third, the increased reliance on mortgage brokers who originated the loans but had little stake after they were securitized was a departure from the traditional buy-and-hold strategy of many financial institutions. These brokers typically are compensated based on volumes of loans made and sometimes on the rates and fees as well; as a result, the brokers have few incentives to worry about the longer-term viability of the mortgage.

To better understand the subprime issue, the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston has been studying publicly-available information from the Registries of Deeds in New England states, which allows us to study the patterns of mortgages issued on a given house over time. ... A first finding is that recent foreclosures have been disproportionately related to multi-family dwellings... This highlights a potentially serious problem for tenants, who may not have known that the owner might be in a precarious financial position. Second, the Banks research shows that the duration of a subprime mortgages is on average quite short for a sample of subprime mortgages used to purchase a home between 1999 and 2004, two-thirds have prepaid within two years and almost 90 percent have prepaid within three years. Prepayment will occur if the home is refinanced or if it is sold. While some of those sales may have been under difficult circumstances, it is plausible that many borrowers who purchased homes with subprime products did benefit from the appreciation of home prices in New England that occurred over the last decade.

In our research, we looked at what happened to homeowners who used subprime loans to buy their homes and found that five years later, 90 percent were either still in their house or had profitably sold it.  While our research also shows that number will likely be lower for the most recent vintages, which already exhibit elevated defaults, most subprime buyers have a positive experience with homeownership. So, perhaps the most critical issue is that financing that supports responsible subprime lending continues, despite recent problems. Since the broker channel has been disrupted, as described earlier, I believe there is an opportunity for commercial and savings banks to help provide liquidity in this market. Most commercial and savings banks were not involved in originating subprime mortgages and are well capitalized, and may have profitable opportunities to explore in this market.

I am hopeful that financial institutions will play an important role in providing financing for many of the borrowers facing higher rates as their mortgages reset. In the past, rate-resets may not have been as problematic as they could be now, because borrowers had an easier time refinancing or selling. As we look at the situation now, we want to see borrowers continue to have the option to refinance, and want to see lenders continue lending so that resets do not become an increasing problem. As I said a moment ago, perhaps the most critical issue is that financing that supports responsible subprime lending continue.

The Federal Reserve has neither the power nor the desire to bail out bad investments. We do have the responsibility to do what we can to maintain normal financial market processes. What that means, in my view, is that we want to see restoration of active trading in assets of all sorts and in all risk classes. It is for the market to judge whether securities backed by subprime mortgages are worth 20 cents on the dollar, or 50 cents, or 100 cents. Obviously, the market will judge different subprime assets differently, based on careful analysis of the underlying mortgages. That process will take time, as it is expensive to conduct the analysis that good mortgage underwriting would have conducted in the first place. Although there is a substantial distance to go, restoration of normal spreads and trading activity appears to be under way, and we can be confident that in time the market will straighten out the problems. We do not know, however, how much time will be required for us to be able to say that the current episode is over.

[R]egulatory changes and the ongoing growth of the secondary mortgage market increased the ability of lenders, who once typically held mortgages on their books until the loans were repaid, to sell many mortgages to various intermediaries, or "securitizers."  The securitizers in turn pooled large numbers of mortgages and sold the rights to the resulting cash flows to investors, often as components of structured securities.  This "originate-to-distribute" model gave lenders (and, thus, mortgage borrowers) greater access to capital markets, lowered transaction costs, and allowed risk to be shared more widely.  The resulting increase in the supply of mortgage credit likely contributed to the rise in the homeownership rate from 64 percent in 1994 to about 68 percent now--with minority households and households from lower-income census tracts recording some of the largest gains in percentage terms.

However, as has been the case in previous instances of rapid financial innovations, adequate mechanisms to control excessive risk-taking may not have been in place during the subprime market’s greatest growth.  One innovation, further development of securitized products, gave mortgage lenders greater access to the capital markets and spread risks more broadly.  However, securitization also widened the separation of the originators from the ultimate holders of the loans--that is, those who bought securities backed by loans.  In this setup, a classic principal-agent problem can arise if originators (the agents) do not have a sufficient incentive to shield the owners of the securities (the principals) from suffering higher-than-expected losses. 

As you know, I'm a new central banker and policymaker. But I bring to this new role experience in the financial sector touching on a wide range of business lines, asset classes, and types of institutions. I know during a feast there is a strong incentive for market participants to meet the competition and seek competitive advantage by pushing the risk-reward envelope.

Some of this pushing of limits amounts to sustainable innovation. Many of these innovations served desirable ends and allocated greater risk to those investors who had an appetite for it. The subprime mortgage market has brought the American dream of home ownership to many people who previously could not qualify for mortgage loans. These developments, on balance, have been a good thing. But some pushing of limits, in my view, will prove to have been imprudent excess.