Previous periods where residential investment declined for a year or more were either accompanied by, or closely followed by, an economic downturn. But history may or may not repeat itself, because this period of prolonged weakness in housing is distinctive in several other ways that add to uncertainty over its ultimate impact on the broader economy.

[T]he current problems in the subprime market are heavily dependent on economic conditions particularly housing prices.[3] As a result, the outlook for how much worse this problem could become depends critically on the outlook for the economy and the housing market. We are currently expecting the economy to grow well below potential for the next two quarters, before gradually improving over the course of next year. Our research suggests that the foreclosure crisis will get worse before it gets better, but our forecast is quite dependent on how far house prices fall.

Fundamentally, we want to encourage refinancing before a problematic reset. Banks may not have viewed this market as an engaging opportunity when mortgage brokers were going aggressively after the business, but banks may now find profitable lending opportunities in the current environment perhaps, in some cases, with guarantees provided by Federal Housing Administration (FHA) loan guarantees, or state programs.

So, one possibility would be, if the federal government were willing to act as guarantor. For example, suppose that the GSEs were to pay their usual mortgage insurance credit fee to the federal government, which enacted is guarantor -- so, to take away the credit risk from the GSEs, then they could process these jumbo loans and sell them into the secondary market and that would be, I think, of some assistance to the mortgage market.

From the federal government's point of view, they would be taking on some credit risk, which you may or may not be willing to do. I think that if you did that, it would be a good idea to make the GSEs ultimately responsible for some -- any excess losses or some part of excess losses, relative to the premiums that are paid, and leave it to the regulator to determine when the safety and soundness was adequate that the GSEs could make that repayment.

So, I think there might be some mechanisms that would involve federal interaction. But I think it's extremely important, as we look at these options, that we don't take actions that will endanger the safety and soundness of the underlying institutions.

From the Q&A session

At issue is the potential effect of the housing decline on consumer expenditures. The loss of wealth associated with the decline in housing prices, as well as the fact that mortgage payments will absorb a larger portion of disposable income for some consumers, might cause consumption—the largest component of GDP—to grow at a significantly slower rate. While the effect of a change in wealth on consumer expenditures has been notoriously difficult to identify empirically, some recent evidence suggests that changes in housing wealth do affect consumption. 

Despite the positive readings on recent economic performance outside the housing sector, my forecast calls for below trend, slower GDP growth in the fourth quarter of 2007 and first half of next year. This forecast anticipates further weakness in housing in the near term and the likelihood that declines in housing wealth will contribute to a weakening of the pace of consumer spending.  

If I were to use one word to characterize our current economic circumstances, that word would be "uncertain." Much of this uncertainty relates to the potential depth, length, and impact of the housing downturn and potential flow-back to Main Street from the turbulence we have seen on Wall Street.

In my view, the most likely story line is one involving a moderate slowdown in economic activity over the coming quarters, with a return to growth near trend by late 2008 as the housing sector begins to recover. Underpinning this story is the view that our modern market economy has a keen ability to self-correct as opportunistic capital moves into depressed markets. Markets correct. And market solutions are preferable. This transition already is happening in the market for subprime mortgages. In this story, financial markets may endure some more weeks or months of volatility, but I believe they will find a restructured state of "normality," involving improved risk management practices, reduced leverage, and greater transparency.

An appropriate public policy posture is to be supportive of market solutions in the financial markets.

Looking ahead, two considerations suggest that conditions for subprime borrowers have the potential to get worse before they get better. First, all indications are that housing activity is continuing to weaken. Incoming data in recent weeks show that sales and new residential construction have declined further. In such an environment, house prices in the aggregate are likely to remain sluggish for some time. Second, the bulk of resets is yet to come: On average, in each quarter from now until the end of next year, monthly payments for more than 400,000 subprime mortgages are scheduled to undergo their first interest rate reset. That number is up from roughly 200,000 per quarter during the first half of 2007. Delinquencies and foreclosures are therefore likely to continue to rise for a number of quarters.

Lenders and servicers generally would want to work with borrowers to avoid foreclosure, which, according to industry estimates, can lead to a loss of as much as 40 percent to 50 percent of the unpaid mortgage balance. Loss mitigation techniques that preserve homeownership are typically less costly than foreclosure, particularly when applied before default. Borrowers who have been current in their payments but could default after reset may be able to work with their lender or servicer to adjust their payments or otherwise change their loans to make them more manageable. Comprehensive data about how many loan workouts and modifications have actually occurred are not available, but some reports suggest that the numbers may be limited thus far.

Given the substantial number of resets from now through the end of 2008, however, I believe it would behoove the industry to join together and explore collaborative, creative efforts to develop prudent loan modification programs and other assistance to help large groups of borrowers systematically.

Second, I believe that modernization of programs administered by the Federal Housing Administration, which has considerable experience helping low- and moderate-income households obtain home financing, could also help avoid foreclosures. FHA modernization could give the agency the flexibility to work with private-sector lenders to expedite the refinancing of creditworthy subprime borrowers and to design products that improve affordability through such features as variable maturities or shared appreciation.

Third, we must pursue initiatives to prevent these problems from recurring, and the Federal Reserve is making strides in this direction. ... For example, as I mentioned earlier, failure to escrow for taxes and insurance can lead to a situation akin to payment shock for borrowers. It is a common practice for these payments to be escrowed in the prime markets, and I see no reason that escrows should not be standard practice in the subprime markets too.

To the extent possible, efforts should be made to avoid foreclosure. We encourage servicers to reach out to financially stressed homeowners, to make every effort to keep them in their homes. Lenders and servicers, for example, may be able to assist troubled borrowers by modifying the loan, deferring payments, extending the loan maturities, converting an adjustable-rate mortgage to a fixed-rate or fully-indexed loan, or capitalizing delinquent amounts. The best outcome is a loss mitigation strategy that results in a mortgage obligation that the borrower can meet in a sustained manner.

To me, the uncertainties about how financial conditions might evolve and affect the real economy mean that risk management considerations have an important role in the current policy environment. The cutback in nonconforming mortgage originations and the continued high level of inventories of unsold homes will result in further weakness in housing markets. Under one scenario, the effects on overall growth will be fairly isolated to declines in residential construction similar to our experience in 2006 and early 2007. However, there is a less benign possibility. Housing demand and prices could weaken a good deal more than we expect either because a new shock hits the sector or because we have underestimated the weakness already in train. A more pronounced downturn could weigh more heavily on consumer spending. In addition, further delinquencies and foreclosures could add to the problems with mortgage-backed securities. This, in turn, could generate further adverse effects on financial conditions that support economic activity. Together, such events would pose a more serious downside risk to growth. I want to emphasize that I do not see this extreme outcome as likely. But it is one of those high cost outcomes that we should guard against.

[O]ur baseline forecast sees soft economic activity this fall; notably, it is likely that a further sharp decline in residential investment will weigh on the top-line growth numbers. But we see growth recovering next year and moving up to average close to potential later in 2008, which we at the Chicago Fed currently see as being somewhat above 2-1/2 percent. This lower potential number in part reflects an assumed trend in productivity growth that is slower than the trend we experienced over the 1995-2003 period. Nonetheless, the new productivity trend is still a healthy one by longer-term historical standards and, accordingly, should support income creation, job growth, and household and business spending. Solid demand for our exports should also be a plus for growth. Although we expect a small increase in the unemployment rate, labor markets in general should remain healthy. Indeed, on balance, I would characterize the data we have received on the real economy since the last FOMC meeting as supporting our baseline forecast.

Residential investment has been a major source of weakness in the economy for a year and a half. Forecasters who were predicting a recovery in the housing sector by the end of this year have been revising down their forecasts to incorporate the effect of rising mortgage defaults, financial turmoil, and softening housing prices. Particularly notable is the decline in housing prices in many regions of the country. Consumer spending is affected by households net worth and housing equity is an important component of wealth. While the effect of the problems in housing on consumption has been muted to date, further and more widespread deterioration in housing prices would increase the risk of a more adverse impact on consumption.