wricaplogo

Overview: Wed, July 22

Daily Agenda

Time Indicator/Event Comment
07:00MBA mortgage prch. indexMild declines the last two weeks
09:20Fed bill purchase4- to 12-month maturities
11:00Treasury buyback announcement (liq support)Nominal coupons 10Y to 30Y
11:3017-wk bill auction$72 billion offering
13:0020-yr bond (r) auction$13 billion offering
14:00Treasury buyback (liq support)TIPS 1Y to 10Y
15:00Treasury investor class auction dataMid-July data

Federal Reserve and the Overnight Market

Treasury Finance

  • Treasury Highlights for Wednesday, July 22, 2026

    9:20 am: Fed bill purchase in the 4- to 12-month sector
    11:00 am: Treasury buyback announcement
    11:30 am: 17-week bill auction
    1:00 pm: 20-year bond (r) auction
    2:00 pm: Treasury buyback operation

US Economy

This Week's MMO

  • MMO for July 20, 2026

    The Treasury’s quarterly dealer discussion agenda, which was released on Friday, revisited the question of whether it should implement a short-term investment program for cash in the TGA that exceeds its daily minimum cash balance target.  The intramonthly peaks and valleys of its prudential cash balance framework mean that the Treasury can go for extended periods over the course of each month with more cash in the TGA than strictly required.  The financial benefits of redeploying that cash into the repo market are limited in the current market environment, but might become more substantial in the (we think unlikely) event that the moved to a scarce reserves framework.  This week’s newsletter looks at the additional background questions the Treasury is asking about the proposal this quarter.

Credit Risk

Alan Greenspan

Wed, May 07, 2003

Some may see government regulation of OTC derivatives dealers as essential to ensuring efficacious risk management. This view presumes that government regulation can address the challenges these types of markets engender and that it can do so without lessening the effectiveness of market discipline supplied by counterparties. Market participants usually have strong incentives to monitor and control the risks they assume in choosing to deal with particular counterparties. In essence, prudential regulation is supplied by the market through counterparty evaluation and monitoring rather than by authorities. Such private prudential regulation can be impaired--indeed, even displaced--if some counterparties assume that government regulations obviate private prudence.

We regulators are often perceived as constraining excessive risk-taking more effectively than is demonstrably possible in practice. Except where market discipline is undermined by moral hazard, owing, for example, to federal guarantees of private debt, private regulation generally is far better at constraining excessive risk-taking than is government regulation.

 

Alan Greenspan

Wed, June 20, 2001

As our economy expanded, business and household financing needs increased and projections of future outcomes turned increasingly optimistic. In such a context, the loan officers whose experience counsels that the vast majority of bad loans are made in the latter stages of a business expansion, have had the choice of (1) restraining lending, and presumably losing market share or (2) hoping for repayment of new loans before conditions turn adverse. Given the limited ability to foresee turning points, the competitive pressures led, as has usually been the case, to a deterioration of underlying loan quality as the peak in the economy approached.

Alan Greenspan

Mon, February 23, 1998

But we must be concerned about becoming too complacent about evaluating repayment risks. All too often at this stage of the business cycle, the loans that banks extend later make up a disproportionate share of total nonperforming loans. In addition, quite possibly, twelve or eighteen months hence, some of the securities purchased on the market could be looked upon with some regret by investors.

<<  1 2 [3

MMO Analysis