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Overview: Mon, May 20

Daily Agenda

Time Indicator/Event Comment
07:30Bostic (FOMC voter)
Appears on Bloomberg television
08:45Bostic (FOMC voter)Gives welcoming remarks at Atlanta Fed conference
09:00Barr (FOMC voter)Speaks at financial markets conference
09:00Waller (FOMC voter)
Gives welcoming remarks
10:30Jefferson (FOMC voter)
On the economy and the housing market
11:3013- and 26-wk bill auction$70 billion apiece
14:00Mester (FOMC voter)
Appears on Bloomberg television
19:00Bostic (FOMC voter)Moderates discussion at financial markets conference

US Economy

Federal Reserve and the Overnight Market

Treasury Finance

This Week's MMO

  • MMO for May 20, 2024

     

    This week’s MMO includes our regular quarterly tabulations of major foreign bank holdings of reserve balances at the Federal Reserve.  Once again, FBOs appear to have compressed their holdings of Fed balances by nearly $300 billion on the latest (March 31) quarter-end statement date.  As noted in the past, we think FBO window-dressing effects are one of a number of ways to gauge the extent of surplus reserves in the banking system at present.  The head of the New York Fed’s market group earlier this month highlighted a few others, which we discuss this week as well.  The bottom line on all of these measures is that any concerns about potential reserve stringency are still a very long way off.

Credit Risk

Alan Greenspan

Wed, May 07, 2003

Some may see government regulation of OTC derivatives dealers as essential to ensuring efficacious risk management. This view presumes that government regulation can address the challenges these types of markets engender and that it can do so without lessening the effectiveness of market discipline supplied by counterparties. Market participants usually have strong incentives to monitor and control the risks they assume in choosing to deal with particular counterparties. In essence, prudential regulation is supplied by the market through counterparty evaluation and monitoring rather than by authorities. Such private prudential regulation can be impaired--indeed, even displaced--if some counterparties assume that government regulations obviate private prudence.

We regulators are often perceived as constraining excessive risk-taking more effectively than is demonstrably possible in practice. Except where market discipline is undermined by moral hazard, owing, for example, to federal guarantees of private debt, private regulation generally is far better at constraining excessive risk-taking than is government regulation.

 

Alan Greenspan

Wed, June 20, 2001

As our economy expanded, business and household financing needs increased and projections of future outcomes turned increasingly optimistic. In such a context, the loan officers whose experience counsels that the vast majority of bad loans are made in the latter stages of a business expansion, have had the choice of (1) restraining lending, and presumably losing market share or (2) hoping for repayment of new loans before conditions turn adverse. Given the limited ability to foresee turning points, the competitive pressures led, as has usually been the case, to a deterioration of underlying loan quality as the peak in the economy approached.

Alan Greenspan

Mon, February 23, 1998

But we must be concerned about becoming too complacent about evaluating repayment risks. All too often at this stage of the business cycle, the loans that banks extend later make up a disproportionate share of total nonperforming loans. In addition, quite possibly, twelve or eighteen months hence, some of the securities purchased on the market could be looked upon with some regret by investors.

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MMO Analysis